Abstract
Routing decisions are traditionally driven by performance metrics such as hop count or latency, leaving trust as a secondary, often implicit, consideration. Two previous works proposed DrATC, a dynamic routing algorithm that selectively combines multiple trust characteristics (i.e., direct, indirect, transitive, context-dependent, and others) to compute the most trustworthy path in a network, and DrATC+, which extended this model with a divide et impera strategy that segments messages across multiple trusted paths to improve resilience against node failures and malicious behavior. Both contributions, however, were validated exclusively through illustrative numerical scenarios and pseudocode, leaving open the question of whether the proposed trust model can be operationalized on top of real routing infrastructure. In this paper, we take a first step towards closing this gap. We present a proof-of-concept testbed that integrates the DrATC/DrATC+ trust model with the Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) protocol, running on virtualized Linux routing infrastructure (Linux network namespaces and the BIRD routing daemon). Trust values are translated into OSPF interface costs through a direct, monotonic mapping, and a lightweight external trust monitor reproduces the trust feedback loop described in DrATC+, updating link costs at runtime in response to simulated malicious behavior. We reproduce three representative use cases drawn directly from DrATC and DrATC+ (i.e., direct trust-based routing, direct and indirect trust-based routing, and multipath routing with a malicious node) and find that, in all three, a real OSPF implementation reproduces the routing decisions originally computed analytically. We explicitly frame this work as a proof of concept rather than an exhaustive evaluation, and we discuss the steps needed, including genuine trust-weighted multipath and event-driven convergence measurement, towards a more comprehensive experimental validation of trust-based dynamic routing.
Authors: Davide Ferraris, Lorenzo Monti, Lucio Russo
Conference/Journal: 22nd International Workshop on Security and Trust Management (STM 2026), in conjunction with ESORICS 2026, Rome, 18 September 2026
Keywords: Trust, Network, Routing, OSPF